A future for media studies: Cultural labour, cultural relations, cultural politics by Miller, T.
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Media studies has been dominated by three
topics: infrastructure, content, and audiences.
Approaches to infrastructure vary between neo-
liberal endorsements of limited regulation of
ownership by the state to facilitate market entry
by new competitors, Marxist critiques of the
bourgeois media for controlling the socio-politi-
cal agenda, and nationalist interventions to pro-
tect local commerce and culture. Approaches to
content vary between hermeneutics, which
unearths the meaning of individual texts and
links them to broader social formations and
problems, and content analysis, which estab-
lishes patterns across significant numbers of sim-
ilar texts, rather than close readings of individual
ones. And approaches to audiences vary between
social-psychological and culturalist attempts to
correlate audiovisual consumption with social
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conduct and policy critiques of imported audiovisual material threatening
national and regional autonomy. These three components, fractured by politics,
nation, discipline, theory, and method, are embodied in what I call Media Studies
1.0 and Media Studies 2.0. Both are ultimately to do with audiences. Media
Studies 1.0 panics about citizens and consumers as audiences, whereas Media
Studies 2.0 celebrates them. I investigate their histories here and make a case for
generating a panic-free, critical, internationalist Media Studies 3.0, taking elec-
tronic gaming and the international precariat movement as examples of how we
might do so. Throughout, I draw on the four core concepts that inform this vol-
ume.1
Media Studies 1.0
Media Studies 1.0 derived from the spread of new media technologies over the
past two centuries into the lives of urbanizing populations and the policing ques-
tions they posed to both state and capital: What would be the effects on cultural
publics of these developments, and how would they vary between those with a
stake in the social order versus those seeking to transform it? By the early twenti-
eth century, academic experts had decreed media audiences to be passive con-
sumers, thanks to the missions of literary criticism (distinguishing the aesthetically
cultivated from others) and psychology (distinguishing the socially competent
from others).2 The origins of social psychology can be traced to anxieties about
“the crowd” in a suddenly urbanized and educated Western Europe that raised the
prospect of a long-feared “ochlocracy” of “the worthless mob”3 able to share pop-
ular texts. In the wake of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke was animated by
the need to limit collective exuberance via restraint on popular passions.4 Elite
theorists emerged from both right and left to argue that newly literate publics
were vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues. The founder of the “American
Dream,” the Latino James Truslow Adams, saw “[t]he mob mentality of the city
crowd” as “one of the menaces to modern civilization.” He was particularly dis-
paraging about “the prostitution of the moving-picture industry.”5 These critics
were frightened of socialism; they were frightened of democracy; and they were
frightened of popular reason.6 With civil society growing restive, the emergence of
radical politics was explained away in socio-psychological terms rather than polit-
ical-economic ones. The psy-function warmed itself by campus fires, far from the
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crowding mass. In the U.S., Harvard took charge of theorizing, Chicago observ-
ing, and Columbia enumerating the great unwashed.7
The famous U.S. Payne-Fund studies of the 1930s investigated the impact of
films on what a gaggle of sociologists labelled “‘superior’ adults” (this expression
referred to “young college professors, graduate students and their wives”) versus chil-
dren from juvenile centres. Researchers wanted to know: “what effect do motion
pictures have upon children of different ages?” especially on what were known as
the “retarded.” These pioneering scholars boldly set out to discover whether “the
onset of puberty is or is not affected by motion pictures” by what they called “The
Big Three” narrative themes: love, crime, and sex (sound familiar?) pondering
“demonstrations of satisfying love techniques” to see whether “sexual passions are
aroused and amateur prostitution … aggravated” by the screen. They gauged re-
actions through “autobiographical case studies,” questionnaires asking whether “All
Most Many Some Few No Chinese are cunning and underhand,” and “skin re-
sponse” measured by psychogalvanometers attached to young people in cinemas and
hypnographs and polygraphs wired to them in their beds.8
The Payne-Fund studies birthed seven decades of obsessive social-scientific
attempts to correlate youthful consumption of popular culture with anti-social
conduct, scrutinizing audiences in terms of where they came from, how many
there were, and what they did as a consequence of participating. In 1951, Dallas
Smythe wrote of this effects research, “Everybody seems to be doing it, especially
those who are best qualified by virtue of the fact that ‘they wouldn’t have a tele-
vision set in the house.’”9 Recalling the 1960s in Greenwich Village, Bob Dylan
remembers, “Sociologists were saying that tv had deadly intentions and was
destroying the minds and imaginations of the young—that their attention span
was being dragged down.” The other dominant site of knowledge Dylan encoun-
tered was the “psychology professor, a good performer, but originality not his
long suit.”10
Purveyors of normal science continue to cast a shadow across that village, and
many others. The pattern is that when cultural technologies and genres emerge,
young people are identified as both pioneers and victims, simultaneously endowed
by marketers and critics with power and vulnerability. They are held to be the first
to know and the last to understand the media—the grand paradox of youth, lat-
terly on display in the digital sublime of technological determinism, as always
with the super-added valence of a future citizenship in peril. Concerns about
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 supposedly unprecedented and unholy risks from new media recur. Damnation
was sure to follow cheap novels during the 1900s, silent then sound film of the
teens and 1920s, radio in the 1930s, comic books from the 1940s and 50s, pop
music and television as per the 1950s and 60s, satanic rock and video cassette
recorders of the 1970s and 80s, and rap music, video games, the Internet, and sex-
ting since the 1990s. The satirical paper The Onion cleverly mocked these inter-
dependent phenomena of moral panic and commodification via a faux study of
the impact on U.S. youth of seeing Janet Jackson’s breast in a 2004 Super Bowl
broadcast.11
Effects studies suffer all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological rea-
soning. They rely on methodological individualism, failing to account for cultural
norms, let alone the arcs of history that establish patterns of text and response
inside politics, war, ideology, and discourse. Each laboratory test, based on, as the
refrain goes, “a large university in the mid-West [of the United States],” is coun-
tered by a similar experiment, with conflicting results. As politicians, grant-givers,
and jeremiad-wielding pundits call for more and more research to prove that the
media make you stupid, violent, and apathetic—or the opposite—academics line
up at the trough to indulge their contempt for popular culture, and their rent-
seeking urge for public money. Media Studies 1.0 rarely interrogates its own con-
ditions of existence—namely, that governments, religious groups, and the media
themselves use it to account for social problems by diverting blame onto popular
culture. And it takes each new medium and genre as an opportunity to affirm its
omniscient agenda. Consider Dorothy G. Singer and Jerome L. Singer’s febrile
twenty-first-century call for centring media effects within the study of child devel-
opment: “can we ignore the impact on children of their exposure through televi-
sion and films or, more recently, to computer games and arcade video games that
involve vast amounts of violent actions?”12
Whereas effects research focuses on the cognition and emotion of individual
human subjects via observation and experimentation, another way of considering
audiences looks to the customs and patriotic feelings exhibited by collective
human subjects, the grout of national culture. In place of psychology, it is con-
cerned with politics. The media do not make you a well- or ill-educated person, a
wild or self-controlled one. Rather, they make you a knowledgeable and loyal
national subject, or a naïf who is ignorant of local tradition and history. Cultural
belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the touchstone of this model. Instead of
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measuring responses electronically or behaviourally, it interrogates the geopolitical
origin of popular texts and the themes and styles they embody, with particular
attention to the putatively nation-building genres of drama, news, sport, and cur-
rent affairs. Adherents hold that local citizens should control television, for
instance, because they can be counted on in the event of war.
Canadians have a unique purchase on anxieties about U.S. screen domination.
Even before the inception of television in 1952, affection for Yankee culture was
officially derided as unpatriotic, because 150,000 tv sets in Canada were tuned to
U.S. signals. There has been over half a century of battling what is perceived as
“an ideological misrecognition whereby Canadians mistake American television
for what they really like while simultaneously neglecting the Canadian television
that they ought to like.”13 This is not always about protecting one form of cultural
nationalism (Canadian) against another (U.S.). It can also offer services that sup-
ply and demand cannot. For example, the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network
enables the maintenance of Native culture by targeting viewers across a massive
country, often in small clusters and different language groups. The only way the
Network could exist is via a mandate from regulators—market economics would
probably see the spectrum space go to a U.S.-programmed network.14
In addition to audience research and cultural policy, Media Studies 1.0
includes political economy, which focuses on infrastructure rather than audiences
but also works from the nostrum that the media are all-powerful, and critical the-
ory, which is concerned that the audiovisual sector turns people away from artistic
and social traces of authentic intersubjectivity and towards control of individual
consciousness. Political economy is more policy-oriented and political in its focus
on institutional power, whereas critical theory is more philosophical and aesthetic
in its desire to develop modernism and the avant-garde. But they began as one
with lamentations for the triumph of industrialized cultural production and the
loss of a self-critical philosophical address. The two approaches are linked via dis-
taste for what they deride as mass culture. Because demand is dispersed and sup-
ply centralized, the media supposedly operate via an administrative logic. Far from
reflecting already-established and -revealed preferences of consumers in reaction to
tastes and desires, they manipulate audiences from the apex of production.
Coercion is mistaken for free will, and culture is one more industrial process sub-
ordinated to dominant economic forces within society that seek standardization.
The only element that might stand against their levelling sameness is said to be
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individual consciousness. But that consciousness has itself been customized to effi-
cient media production.15 We are all familiar with this account, thanks to latter-
day Frankfurters who continue to offer it to us, and their scornful critics from
Media Studies 2.0, who continue to denounce its pessimism and snobbery in the
name of populism.
Media Studies 2.0
For Media Studies 2.0, popular culture represents the apex of modernity. Far
from being supremely alienating, it embodies the expansion of civil society, the
first moment in history when political and commercial organs and agendas
became receptive to, and part of, the popular classes; when the general popula-
tion counted as part of the social, rather than being excluded from political-eco-
nomic calculations. At the same time, there was a lessening of authority, the
promulgation of individual rights and respect, and the development of intense
but large-scale human interaction. This perspective has offered a way in to media
audiences that differs from Media Studies 1.0 and its faith in the all-powerful
agency of the media. For in Media Studies 2.0, the all-powerful agent is the audi-
ence. 2.0 claims that the public is so clever and able that it makes its own mean-
ings, outwitting institutions of the state, academia, and capitalism that seek to
measure and control it. In the case of children and the media, a new culturalist
perspective has challenged anxieties from 1.0 about turning Edenic innocents
into rabid monsters, capitalist dupes, or mental Americans. This formation has,
for example, animated research into how children distinguish between fact and
fiction; the generic features and intertexts of children’s news, drama, action-
adventure, education, cartooning, and play; and how talking about the media
makes for social interaction.16
Faith in the active audience can reach cosmic proportions. It has been a donnée
of 2.0 that the media are not responsible for anything. This position is a virtual
nostrum in some research into fans, who are thought to construct connections
with celebrities and actants in ways that mimic friendship, make sense of human
interaction, and ignite cultural politics. The critique commonly attacks opponents
of commercial culture for misrecognizing its capacity to subvert patriarchy, capi-
talism, and other forms of oppression. The popular is held to have progressive
effects, because it is decoded by people in keeping with their social situations. The
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active audience is said to be weak at the level of cultural production, but strong as
an interpretative community. All this is supposedly evident to scholars from their
perusal of audience conventions, web pages, discussion groups, quizzes, and rank-
ings, or by staring at screens with their children. Consumption is the key to Media
Studies 2.0—with production discounted, labour forgotten, consumers sovereign,
and governments there to protect them.
Cybertarian technophiles, struck by the “digital sublime,” attribute magical
properties to contemporary communications and cultural technologies that oblit-
erate geography, sovereignty, and hierarchy in an alchemy of truth and beauty. A
deregulated, individuated media world supposedly makes consumers into produc-
ers, frees the disabled from confinement, encourages new subjectivities, rewards
intellect and competitiveness, links people across cultures, and allows billions of
flowers to bloom in a post-political cornucopia. It’s a kind of Marxist/Godardian
wet dream, where people fish, hunt, film, and write cheques from morning to
midnight. In his survey of this work, Vincent Mosco rightly argues that such
“myths are important both for what they reveal (including a genuine desire for
community and democracy) and for what they conceal (including the growing
concentration of communication power in a handful of transnational media busi-
nesses).”17 At such moments, we can say that what Terry Eagleton sardonically
named The Reader’s Liberation Movement is in the house.18
The Movement informs quasi-libertarian critiques of Canadian cultural policy
for condescending attitudes to the earthy choices made by “ordinary” consumers,
maintaining that viewers should be trusted rather than countered by elites, whose
desire to strengthen the nation through culture is said to be self-serving and
impossible.19 In the case of white settler colonies such as Canada, Will Kymlicka
argues that culture aids individual autonomy through engagement with collective
as well as individual histories.20 It can allocate preferences effectively on a market
basis, provided that collective inequality does not distort history and life chances.
He suggests that majority settlers and their offspring should trust in market
dynamics. They don’t merit cultural rights. Recent voluntary migrants deserve
some cultural rights. First Peoples, the dispossessed, and the enslaved deserve
many. Yet the much-vaunted organic capacity of, for example, hockey to bind
Canadians together on a market basis rather than a policy one has been dwarfed
by the desire of television networks to target specific territories through localizing
technologies, which has seen them tailor coverage to particular audiences. That
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desire has neither reflected nor encouraged multiculturalism, as is evident from
the routine racism and sexism of commentators.21
The fundamental dilemma for the political claims of Media Studies 2.0 is this:
Can fans be said to engage in labour exploitation, patriarchy, racism, and neo-
imperialism, or in some specifiable way make a difference to politics beyond their
own selves, when they interpret tv unusually, sms (short message service) each
other about romantic frustrations, or play pirated versions of Scrabble on
Facebook? Have we gone too far in supplanting the panicky Woody Allen nebbish-
ness of 1.0 (“I’m kind of bothered that…”) with the Panglossian Pollyanna nerdi-
ness of 2.0 (“Cool stuff”)? Virginia Postrel, then editor of the libertarian Reason
magazine and later a New York Times economics journalist, wrote a Wall Street
Journal op-ed welcoming 2.0 as “deeply threatening to traditional leftist views of
commerce … lending support to the corporate enemy and even training graduate
students who wind up doing market research.”22 That should give us pause.
Consider the juncture of 1.0 and 2.0 in games studies. A powerful binary
 situates at one antinomy (1.0) omnipotent corporate technocrats plot to control
the emotions and thoughts of young people around the world and turn them
into malleable consumers, workers, and killers through electronic games; at the
other antinomy (2.0) all-powerful desiring machines, called players, are satisfied
by malleable producers. But the fantasy that innovation comes from supply-and-
demand mechanics is misleading. The state—specifically the military—is at the
core. 2.0 fails to explain the long-standing imbrication of electronic games and
the U.S. military.23
2.0 savants are fond of invoking pre-capitalist philosophers, dodging questions
of labour exploitation by heading for texts. High aesthetics and high technology
are brokered through high neo-liberalism. 2.0 refers to ludology (but ignores the
work of the Association for the Study of Play and the North American Society for
the Sociology of Sport) and narratology, returning to the non-materialist, non-
medium-specific work of literary studies (but ignoring work undertaken by the
International Association for Media and Communication Research, the Canadian
Communications Association, and the Union for Democratic Communications).
Drawing on the possessive individualism of neoclassical economics, game analysts
study virtual environments as ways of understanding “whole societies under
 controlled conditions,” neglecting or caricaturing history and ethnography in 
the process.24 1.0 and 2.0 met unhappily in a U.S. law case over a commercial
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ordinance that required games manufacturers to advise parents that their products
were risky for young people, with 2.0 savants supporting corporate interests.25
Media Studies 3.0
We need more frottage between Media Studies 1.0 and 2.0, breaking down the
binary between them. 1.0 should register struggle, and 2.0 should register struc-
ture. Currently, 1.0 draws our attention to audience inoculation and corporate
control, but leaves out productive labour—the key place where value is made. 2.0
draws our attention to uptake and response, but again marginalizes work. 1.0
misses moments of crisis and hope, presenting a subject-free picture with structure
but no agency, other than psychological response, shareholder maximization, and
managerial rationality. Its nationalistic cultural policies often deny the banality of
protected cinema, the futility of quota-driven television, and the partiality of who
is chosen to create national images and appear in them. 2.0 misses forms of dom-
ination and exploitation, presenting an institution-free picture with agency but no
structure, other than fan creativity and reader imagination. Both 1.0 and 2.0 are
doggedly tied to nativist epistemologies that must be transcended. The nativism is
especially powerful in the U.S., Britain, and their academic satellites such as Israel
and Australia, where effortless extrapolations from very limited experiences sup-
port totalizing theories and norms, due to the hegemony of English-language
publishing and scholarly links to the warfare, welfare, and cultural bureaucracies.
To transcend these pitfalls, we need Media Studies 3.0.
3.0 must blend ethnographic, political-economic, and aesthetic analyses in a
global and local way, establishing links between the key areas of cultural produc-
tion around the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East)
and diasporic/dispossessed communities engaged in their own cultural production
(Native peoples, African and Asian diasporas, Latinos, and Middle-Eastern peo-
ples). 3.0 needs to be a media-centred version of area studies, with diasporas as
important as regions. It must be animated by collective identity and power, by
how human subjects are formed and how they experience cultural and social
space. Taking its agenda from social movements as well as intellectual ones, and its
methods from economics, politics, communications, sociology, literature, law, sci-
ence, medicine, anthropology, history, and art, it should focus on gender, race,
class, sexuality, sustainability, and pleasure, across national lines.
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We can gain some tips on how to do this from the history of theorizing cul-
ture. Culture has usually been studied in two registers, via the social sciences and
the humanities—truth versus beauty. It has been a marker of differences and sim-
ilarities in taste and status, as explored interpretatively or methodically. In the
humanities, cultural texts have long been judged by criteria of quality, as practiced
critically and historically. For their part, the social sciences have focused on reli-
gions, customs, times, and spaces, as explored ethnographically or statistically. So
whereas the humanities articulate differences through symbolic norms (for exam-
ple, which class has the cultural capital to appreciate high culture, and which does
not) the social sciences articulate differences through social norms (for example,
which people cultivate agriculture in keeping with spirituality, and which do
not).26 This distinction feeds into the Cartesian dualism separating thought from
work, which presumes that humans have two distinct natures: the intelligent and
the corporeal. One is focused on action, the other on reason. That binary has
dominated media studies through oppositions it poses between society versus
economy and audience versus meaning. It haunts 1.0 and 2.0.
I suggest that this bifurcation and subsequent silencing of labour and culture,
for all its sticky origins in Cartesianism, cannot and should not hold. Historically,
the best critical political economy and the best cultural studies have worked
through the imbrication of power and signification. Blending them can heal the
fissure between fact and interpretation, between the social sciences and the
humanities, between truth and beauty, under the sign of a principled approach to
cultural democracy. Lawrence Grossberg recommends “politicizing theory and
theorizing politics” by combining abstraction and grounded analysis.27 That
requires a focus on the contradictions of organizational structures, their articula-
tions with everyday living and textuality, and their intrication with the polity and
economy, addressing production, consumption, and social stratification. Half a
century ago, Smythe studied tv texts as “a group of symbols” that “serve as a
medium of exchange between the mass media and the audience.” He recognized
that analyses of infrastructure and content must be supplemented by an account
of the conditions under which culture is made, circulated, received, interpreted,
and criticized: “The produced program is … more than the sum of the program
ingredients” because it is encrusted with “contextual and explicit layers of mean-
ing” that emerge during its creation and consumption.28
Such work is already underway. Arvind Rajagopal notes that because television,
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the telephone, the Internet, and the neo-liberal are all new to India, “markets and
media generate new kinds of rights and new kinds of imagination … novel ways
of exercising citizenship rights and conceiving politics.”29 For Rosalía Winocur,
women’s talkback radio in Latin America since the fall of U.S.-backed dictator-
ships has offered a simultaneously individual and social forum for new expres-
sions of citizenship in the context of decentred politics, emergent identities,
minority rights, and gender issues—a public space that transcends the subordi-
nation of difference and the privileging of elite experience.30 And Mosco starts
from the power of mythology then “builds a bridge to political economy” in his
investigation of neo-liberal doxa about empowerment, insisting on “the mutually
constitutive relationship between political economy and cultural studies” as each
mounts “a critique of the other.”31 We can see similar intent animating such
innovations as Sarai, the Free Software Foundation, and the Alternative Law
Forum, exemplary instances of Media Studies 3.0 in formation. They blend
internationalism, political economy, ethnography, and textual analysis, and resist
the binarism of 1.0 and 2.0.
To understand media infrastructure, we must address technological innova-
tion, regulation, labour, ownership, and control, utilizing ethnographic, political-
economic, and public-policy research to establish how the media came to be as
they are. To understand content, we must address production and undertake both
content and textual analysis, combining statistical and hermeneutic methods to
establish patterns of meaning. To understand audiences, we must address ratings,
uses-and-gratifications, effects, active-audience, ethnographic, and psychoanalytic
traditions, combining quantitative and qualitative measures to establish the audi-
ence’s composition and conduct in the wake of media consumption. This incar-
nates a simultaneously top-down and bottom-up approach, undertaken always
with an eye to labour issues.
Gamework and the Precariat
Let me exemplify a labour focus. Electronic Arts (ea) is based in California with
“worldwide studios” in British Columbia and offshoots in Montreal, Hong Kong,
Tokyo, China, and Britain, inter alia. ea makes The Sims, National Hockey
League games, FIFA World Cup, and the John Madden “football” franchise. The
company was founded in 1982 by Trip Hawkins. He bought into Media Studies
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1.0 and 2.0 simultaneously, dismissing broadcast television as “brain-deadening”
and embracing “interactive media” as a development “that would connect people
and help them grow.” ea’s name derived from a desire to emphasize art and tech-
nology under the sign of publishing, with developers initially promoted as
authors. Its first games, such as M.U.L.E. and Murder on the Zinderneuf, were
marketed through their designers’ names—rather like rock albums of the day.
These shining young white design geeks were celebrated in a famous 1983 adver-
tisement called “We See Farther.” But geek authorship was soon supplanted. By
the mid-1980s, the “authors” of key games were no longer dweebs in black polo
necks, but Doctor J. and Larry Bird, basketball celebrities brought in as endorsers
and faux designers. Creators lost their moment of fame as authors. A stream of
sports stories drew on promotions underwritten by others’ creativity and money,
displacing what were regarded as the esoteric pursuits of the first innovators.32
The labour process became fetishized as ea bought development studios and
set up design teams on an industrial model. At the same time, the corporation
sought to undermine the existing political economy of the industry by cutting the
discount given to distributors of software, thereby building up revenues. Its next
move was to deal directly with retailers, writing games for personal computers and
consoles and becoming a distributor. In addition to continuing with console
options, in the late 1990s it entered virtual worlds and awakened to female con-
sumers, buying advertising space and time across fashion periodicals and girly tv.
ea is massively successful—2007 revenues were US$3.091 billion, the company
boasts almost 8000 employees, and it is buying other studios.33
In 2004, however, the firm became a byword for the poor labour practices that
characterize the sector when the blogger ea_spouse pseudonymously posted a
vibrant account of the exploitation experienced by her fiancé and others working
at the firm.34 Eloquently ripping back the veneer of joyous cybertarianism from
games development, she disclosed that ea’s claim to blend aesthetics and technol-
ogy, as per its name and corporate trademark—“Challenge Everything”—belied
both the company’s treatment of employees and its products. Regarding labour,
she wrote, “To any ea executive that happens to read this, I have a good challenge
for you: how about safe and sane labour practices for the people on whose backs
you walk for your millions?” Regarding texts: “Churning out one licensed football
game after another doesn’t sound like challenging much of anything to me; it
sounds like a money farm.” The nature of this exploitation is that a putatively
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 limited “pre-crunch” is announced in the period prior to release of a new game.
Forty-eight hour weeks are required, with the alibi that months of this will obviate
the need for a real “crunch” at the conclusion of development. The pre-crunch
goes on beyond its deadline, and 72-hour weeks are mandated. That crunch
passes its promised end, illness and irritability strike, and a new crunch is
announced. Everyone must work 85 to 91-hour weeks, 9 am to 10 pm Monday to
Sunday inclusive, with the (occasional) Saturday evening off, after 6:30 pm. There
is no overtime or leave in return for this massive expenditure of talent and time.
At the very moment that ea_spouse blew the whistle on the corporation,
Fortune magazine ranked ea among the “100 Best Companies to Work For.”
Today, the firm ranks sixty-second in the magazine’s “List of Industry Stars” and
ninety-first amongst firms that “try hard to do right by their staff” as measured by
the Great Place to Work35 Institute in San Francisco. ea calls itself “a one-class
society,” and its Vice-President of Human Resources, Rusty Rueff, operates with
the following (astonishing) dictum: “Most creativity comes at one of two times:
When your back is up against the wall or in a time of calm.” In case readers find
this firing squad analogy alarming, Fortune reassures them that workers can
“refresh their energy with free espresso or by playing volleyball and basketball.”
But the exploitation begat a class-action lawsuit.36 ea’s website boasts about its
labour record, but not in terms of the class action—rather, that it fares well on the
Human Rights Campaign’s Corporate Equality Index.37
The bold intervention (as we say in cultural studies) or outburst (as they say
elsewhere) by ea_spouse generated febrile and substantial responses, such as calls
for unionization, appeals to federal and state labour machinery, confirmation
that ea was horrendous but by no means aberrant, frustration that the bour-
geois press was disinclined to investigate or even report the situation, denunci-
ations of asinine managerialism and private-sector bureaucracy (for example,
“The average game company manager is quite possibly the worst qualified
leader of people in the world”) and a recognition that intellectual property
rights make labour disposable (“I’m beginning to think that ea is really nothing
more than a licensing warehouse. They’ll always be able to recruit naïve talent to
slave away … alienating talent is not a big problem for them”). Ea_spouse now
runs a website that is bombarded with horror stories by angry former idealists
from all over the globe who thought they were doing “cool stuff” until they
experienced web-shop horror.38
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We inhabit a world where flexibility is the mega-sign of affluence, and precar-
iousness its flipside; where one person’s calculated risk is another’s burden of
labour; where inequality is represented as the outcome of a moral test; and the
young are supposed to calculate that insecurity is an opportunity rather than a
constraint. Cue Electronic Arts. But not everyone succumbs to Media Studies
1.0’s sense of helplessness or Media Studies 2.0’s rhetoric of empowerment. Cue
ea_spouse and a developing discourse about flexible labour amongst cultural
workers who are segmented through deregulation and new technology.
In Western Europe and Japan, this group is naming itself. The precariat/pré-
caires/precari@s/precari go under the signs of “San Precario” and “Our Lady of
the Precariat,” who guard the spirit of the “flashing lights of life.” The movement
embodies a new style, a new identity struggling for security against neo-liberalism
that has been formed from young, female, mobile, international workers within
the culture industries, services, and the knowledge sector. Antonio Negri refers to
this group as the cognitariat: people with high levels of educational attainment
and great facility with cultural and communications technologies and genres.38 A
new breed of productive workers, they play key roles in the production and circu-
lation of goods and services, through both creation and coordination. This new
proletariat is not defined in terms of factories and manufactures opposed to rul-
ing-class force and ideology. Instead, it is formed from those whose immediate
forebears, with similar or lesser cultural capital, were the salariat, and confident of
guaranteed health care and retirement income. The new group lacks both the
organization of the traditional working class and the political entrée of the old
middle class. Today’s “culturalisation of production” both enables these intellec-
tuals, by placing them at the centre of world economies; and disables them, by
doing so under conditions of flexible production and ideologies of “freedom.”
Since 2001, the Euromayday Network has organized Precariat parades in
twenty European cities, featuring “contortionists of flexibility … high-wire
artists of mobility … jugglers of credit,” along with apparitions by San Precario
to protect his children against evil bosses.39 In 2005, San Precario appeared in the
form of a worker uniformed and supplicant on his knees, with a neon sign on his
head. Participants note the instability of working life today, and hail a new class
of sex workers, domestic servants, and media creators at <maydaysur.org>. Their
manifesto reads:
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Somos precarios y precarias, atípicos, temporales, móviles, flexibles
Somos la gente que está en la cuerda floja, en equilibrio inestable
Somos la gente deslocalizada y reconvertida
We are the precariat, atypical, temporary, mobile, flexible
We are the people on the high wire, in unstable equilibrium
We are the displaced and made-over people
The Precariat recognizes the complex connection between “eslóganes de los
movimientos sociales, reapropiados por el neoliberalismo” [social-movement
 slogans reappropriated for neo-liberalism]. It realizes that concepts like diversity,
culture, and sustainability create spectacles, manage workers, and enable gentrifica-
tion. Similarly, Espai en blanc “afirma que vivimos en la sociedad del conocimiento
y en cambio no existen ideas” [affirms that we live in a society of knowledge and
change where ideas barely exist] (espaienblanc.net). Adbusters and cultural
 jamming work in cognate ways (adbusters.org). When the Precariat and culture
jammers analyze globalization and declare a new “phenomenology of labor,” a
“world horizon of production,” they are reoccupying and resignifying the space of
corporate-driven divisions of labour in ways that 1.0 and 2.0 have simply ignored.
Pace apologists for the creative industries, who argue that the precariat is a fabula-
tion of nostalgic leftist academics in need of theoretical makeovers, this is an
organic movement of recognition and resistance.40
There are wider implications than labour itself. For example, a scandal
engulfed British reality-tv promotions in 2007 because the bbc, and more overtly
capitalistic enterprises, deceived viewers to cut costs and increase excitement. This
critique soon turned into an appreciation of what happens to the public interest
when programs are made on a project basis by businesses without a commitment
to anything but profit, whose employees lack security and integrity. The British
media executive Dawn Airey (once the author of a television business plan orches-
trated around “films, football, and fucking”) now warns against “the casualisation
of the industry.”41 Similar debates have emerged over the exploitation of child
workers in U.S. reality tv at the hands of sub-contractors—who again eschew
organized labour.
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Conclusion
To summarize, Media Studies 1.0 is misleadingly functionalist on its effects and
political-economy side, and 2.0 is misleadingly conflictual on its active-audience
side. Work done on audience effects and political economy has neglected struggle,
dissonance, and conflict in favour of a totalizing narrative in which the media
dominate everyday life. Work done on active audiences has over-emphasized
struggle, dissonance, and conflict, neglecting infrastructural analysis in favour of a
totalizing narrative in which consumers dominate everyday life.
Immanuel Kant envisaged our “emergence from … self-incurred immaturity”
and independence from religious, governmental, and commercial direction.42 To
help make that possible, critical scholars and activists need to account for the post-
industrial standing of cultural workers and reject a neo-liberal embrace of casual-
ized labour.43 Media Studies 3.0 should synthesize and improve 1.0 and 2.0
through a labour emphasis. This returns us to the origins of social theory: Adam
Smith’s ethnography of work, John Stuart Mill’s account of the liberal individual,
Karl Marx’s observations on the fetishization of commodities, and W. E. B. Du
Bois, Rabindranath Tagore, and José Martí’s encounters with subjectivities split
between production, consumption, and citizenship. There would be no culture,
no media, without labour.44 Labour is central to humanity, but largely absent
from media studies. Let’s change that.
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